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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD L. BEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal No. 880469-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The specific statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on 
the Utah Court of Appeals to decide this appeal is Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The date of the judgment sought to be reviewed is May 25, 
1988, the day Notice of Appeal was filed is July 29, 1988. The 
history of this case is as follows: The case was tried to a jury 
on May 6, 1988 and defendant was convicted of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol; sentence was imposed and judgment pronounced 
on May 25, 1988; on June 3, 1988 defense counsel filed a Motion 
For New Trial; on June 29, 1988 notice was mailed to counsel 
denying Motion For New Trial; on July 29, 1988 Notice of Appeal 
was filed with the trial court and on August 8, 1988 this case was 
fiLed with the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the prosecution must show a correlation between 
blood and breath alcohol content and if the Judge must make a 
finding of trustworthiness before allowing documents of tests for 
alcohol to be admitted as evidence. 
II. Whether it is constitutional error to allow the 
prosecution to rely upon a presumption to prove any element of an 
offense. 
DETERMINITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 7. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(1)(a). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.3(2)(b). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction for Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The date of the judgment sought to be reviewed is May 25, 
1988, the day Notice of Appeal was filed is July 29, 1988. The 
history of this case is as follows: The case was tried to a jury 
on May 6, 1988 and defendnat was convicted of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol; sentence was imposed and judgment pronounced 
on May 25, 1988; on June 3, 1988 defense counsel filed a Motion 
For New Trial; on June 29, 1988 notice was mailed to counsel 
denying Motion For New Trial; on July 29, 1988 Notice of Appeal 
was filed with the trial court and on August 8, 1988 this case was 
filed with the Court of Appeals. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Defendant was convicted of Driving While Under The Influence 
of Alcohol. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was arrested on November 20, 1987 (Transcript at 
Page 39, hereafter T.39) and charged with driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. The facts attendant the case are of little 
relevance on appeal. The State attempted to introduce Exhibit C. 
Defendant objected to the admission of this exhibit based upon 
inconsistancy on the face of the document (T.153-164) . Defendant 
objected to the use of Jury Instruction Number 8 (Record at page 
3, hereafter R.3). The court did not provide time for objections 
before reading the instructions to the jury and consequently the 
objection was made thereafter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in two areas. First, it admitted 
State's Exhibit C. The court did not make the requisite findings 
before admitting the evidence. There was no evidence relating to 
the correlation of the alcohol content of blood and breath. 
Second, Jury Instruction Number 8 instructs the jury on a 
presumption in favor of the prosecution which does not state the 
law correctly. Not only is it a misstatement of the law but it 
also shifts the burden from the State to the defendant on an 
essential element of the offense in violation of defendant's right 
to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION MUST SHOW A CORRELATION 
BETWEEN BLOOD AND BREATH ALCOHOL CONTENT AND IF 
THE JUDGE MUST MAKE A FINDING OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
BEFORE ALLOWING DOCUMENTS OF TESTS FOR ALCOHOL 
TO BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE 
The trial court erred in this case in two separate and 
distinct ways. 
The first error which must be considered deals with the 
admission of States Exhibit C (R.12). Mr. Bee was charged in the 
information as follows: 
DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR 
DRUGS (41-6-44 UCA), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did 
operate and/or have actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state while under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered the 
defendant incapable of safely driving said vehicle, 
and/or driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% by 
weight or greater. (R.6) 
In Instruction Number 6 the jury was instructed in (2)b that: 
Defendant had a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight; and (R.18) 
Both the information and the instruction deal with "blood 
alcohol content." Exhibit C (R.12) also indicates in the upper 
left corner "% alcohol in blood;" however, the affidavit (R.12) 
admitted to show the reliability of the test says "Gives readings 
in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." The Trooper 
testified that he gave Mr. Bee a breath test (T.86). In fact 
Trooper McGuire testified that the results indicated on Exhibit C 
was ".09% percent alcohol in the blood." (T.140). He went on to 
testify that he never drew blood from Mr. Bee (T.141). Utah Code 
Annotated Section 41-6-44(2) specifies the method of measurement 
which defines a violation of this section. There it states: 
Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
Two methods are allowed: one for blood; one for breath. In 
the present case it is very confusing just which method the 
prosecution is attempting to imploy. The fact that it is unclear 
whether or not there is a correlation between the ratios of the 
blood and ratios of the breath as outlined in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-44(2) it was plain error to admit this evidence. The 
individual error of admitting this exhibit is highly prejudicial 
to the defendant. The measurement as indicated on the face of 
Exhibit C by showing " % alcohol in blood11 is a direct 
contradiction of the affidavit executed by Dale Neal attesting to 
the accuracy of the machine where it says it measures "percent 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath." The judge here could not find 
that this complied with Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.3 (2) (b) with 
respect to "trustworthiness." In fact the judge made no such 
finding. The evidence on its face should not have been admitted. 
POINT II 
WHETHER IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR TO ALLOW 
THE PROSECUTION TO RELY UPON A PRESUMPTION 
TO PROVE ANY ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE 
The judge instructed the jury without first allowing 
defendant to object to said instructions (T.230). Instruction 
Number 8 (R.20) states: 
You are instructed that Utah Law provides that if 
the chemical test determining the blood alcohol content 
of the defendant was taken within two hours of the 
alleged driving or actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle, then it shall be presumed that the blood 
alcohol level of the defendant at the time of driving or 
actual physical control was not less than the level of 
alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical 
test. 
Thusf if you find that the aforementioned chemical 
test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving 
or actual physical control of a motor vehicle, you may 
infer that the blood alcohol level of the Defendant at 
the time of the driving or actual physical control was 
not less than the level of alcohol determined to be in 
the blood by the chemical test. 
This instruction does not correctly state the law as it was 
at the time of trial in U.C.A. 41-6-44(1)(a) which provides: 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
There is no presumption of correctness to a test given at any 
time. Here it provides only that the results must be shown by a 
test given within two hours. The presumption instruction has the 
effect of relieving the State of proving each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The burden of proving each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt is upon the State. To shift the burden of 
disproving a presumption in favor of the State deprives the 
defendant the due process pursuant to Utah State Constitution 
Article 1 Section 7. This is further codified in Utah Code 
Annotated 76-1-501. 
In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 105 
S.Ct. 1965 (1985) the United States Supreme Court ruled: 
An irrebuttable or conclusive presumption relieves 
the State of its burden or persuasion by removing the 
presumed element from the case entirely if the State 
proves the predicate facts. A mandatory rebuttatable 
presumption does not remove the presumed element from 
the case if the State proves the predicate facts, but it 
nonetheless relieves the State of the affirmative burden 
of persuasion on the presumed element by instructing the 
jury that it must find the presumed element unless the 
defendant persuades the jury not to make such a finding. 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption is perhaps less 
onerous from the defendant's perspective, but it is no 
less unconstitutional. Our cases make clear that "[sjuch 
shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a 
fact which the State deems so important that it must be 
either proved or presumed is impermissible under the Due 
Process Clause." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 215, 
53 L.Ed.2d 281, 97 S.Ct. 2319. 
This position was reaffirmed by Utah in State v. Chambers, 
709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). Shifting the burden of the State's proof 
to the defendant by a presumption is highly prejudicial and 
deprived defendant of his constitutional right to due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in allowing Exhibit C to be admitted 
and also by allowing Instruction Number 8 to be given to the jury. 
Either one of these errors are reversable because of the prejudice 
to defendant and the negative impact they would have upon the 
jury. For these reasons this court should dismiss the charge or in 
the alternative remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /o day of April, 1989. 
D. Bruce O l i v e r ~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah State Constitution Article lf Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 (1) (a): 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.3(2): 
In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, documents 
offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or 
events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissable if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the time 
of the act, condieiton, or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, atendant circumstances, or results 
of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in teh 
definition of the offense; 
(b) the culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
perponderance of the evidence. 
NORMAN H BANGERTER. GOVERNOR 
RECEIVED 
DEC 2 31987 
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L DALE ELTON. OEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
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DEPARTA\ENT O F PUBLIC SAFETY 
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NO. ^ 
CHEMICAL TEST WITHIN TWO HOURS 
You are instructed that Utah Law provides that if the 
chemical test determining the blood alcohol content of the 
defendant was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle, then it shall be 
presumed that the blood alcohol level of the defendant at the 
time of driving or actual physical control was not less than the 
level of alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical 
test. 
Thus, if you find that the aforementioned chemical test was 
taken within two hours of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle, you may._inf.en_that the blood alcohol 
level of the Defendant at the time of the driving or actual 
physical control was not less than the level of alcohol 
determined to be in the blood by the chemical test. 
UTAH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY RECORD OF INTOXILYZER TEST AND AFFIDAVIT 
I/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial numberj2SLlOJl%Sj 
located at__H^Ul^__da_X^jJ__ 
was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on 3CLCJSL\J 19_^7-at-'^-^-£M-
2. This was done by a currently certified technician and according 
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which 
were made at the time these tests were done. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: YES 
( \yj Electrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) ( ^j 
( \/) Temperature check (Ready light is on) . ( ty^f 
( \s) Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds.. ( U9 
( \ySf Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.).... (1^5 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly).*. ( 
(Error light activates with improper zero set)... ( t^ O 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) ( f") 
Fixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
y, (Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting).... ( uO 
( (Sj Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest).... ( 
( \yY Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath ( lA 
NO 
REPAIRS REQUIRED (Explain) __QD__^bpfiWA^__J5Asft«M>uUiQ.__ ( ) ^ 
( t^The" simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
/properly compounded ( <-f 
( 1^ 0 The results of this test show that the instrument . 
is working properly ( ^) 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on ~3.CLJ2.CJl l^JLZ-
CERTIFIED BREACH TEST. TECHNICIANS) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY. Ojj)Jl/rth_ .! I/We, on oa th , s t a t e t 
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MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Memorial Courthouse Building 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONALD L. BEE, 
Defendant. 
Bail 
INFORMATION 
No.87-200-5077 
The undersigned affiant, J. Maguire, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about the 20th day 
of November, 1987, at State Road 15, County of Davis, State of 
Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT ONE 
DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
(41-6-44 UCA), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time 
and place aforesaid, the defendant did operate and/or have actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state while under 
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered 
the defendant incapable of safely driving said vehicle, and/or 
driving with a blood alcohol content of „08% by weight or greater. 
COUNT TWO 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
UCA), a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and \ y 
place aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly and intentionally 
possess a controlled substance, marijuana. 
COUNT THREE 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (58-37a-5 UCA), a class B 
misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the () 
NO. c 
DEFINITION OF OFFENSE'; AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE 
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of driving a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following numbered elements 
of that offense: 
(1) that on or about the 20th day of November , 1987 
(2) that at that time, one or the other or both of the following 
exhisted: 
a. defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a 
degree which rendered him/her incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle 
or 
b. defendant had a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight; and-
(3) that all acts took place in Davis County Utah 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements.of the offense.beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to convict the defendant, on the othe other hand, if the evidence has 
failed to so establish one or more of said elemants then you should find 
the defendant not guilty. 
1 Your Honor, I don't believe we have any further questions of 
2 him. 
3 THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Oliver? 
4 MR. OLIVER: I would like to look at the 
5 forms for a few more minutes, Your Honor* 
6 MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, I would indicate 
7 for defense counsel and for the Court that I believe Officer 
8 Anderson will be available for a call if we need him. Could 
9 return if we need him later. 
10 THE COURT: If he returns that to you, then 
11 may he be excused? 
12 MR. OLIVER: Yeah, but just give me a minute 
13 to look at the forms. 
u THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. OLIVER: I think that we have no 
16 objections, I just wane to look at the forms for a second, 
17 Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. We will go off 
19 the record. 
20 (Off-the-record.) 
21 (Back on the record.) 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Oliver has expressed 
approval consent that Deputy Anderson may be excused and 
23 
the Bailiff can so notify him when he returns with that 
24 J 
copy. You may go ahead with your next witness, Mr. Major. 
25 
37 
1 works and what you do as far as the test record is 
2 concerned? 
3 A Yes, This -- there are several other 
4 copies. I just placed that into the Intoxilizer machine 
5 and it blows into it and the results ere printed onto this 
6 paper here. 
7 Q Okay. Is there any type of a display on 
8 the machine itself, other than the printing that goes on 
9 that exhibit? 
10 A Yes, there i s. 
11 Q And did you -- when the Defendant blew into 
12 that machine, did you observe the digits on that Intoxilizer 
13 machine? 
14 A Yes, I did. 
15 Q What did they read? 
16 A .097. 
17 Q Okay, thank you. And prior to giving this 
18 test to the Defendant, had you had an opportunity to 
19 observe his mouth at least 15 minutes prior to giving him the 
20 test? 
21 A Yes, I did. 
22 Q Did you observe any foreign objects or any 
23 foreign material in his mouth? 
24 A No, I did not. 
25 Q What time was the test? 
86 
1 
2 
3 I 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q 
A 
Uh-huh. 
No. 
MR. OLIVER: No further questions 
THE COURT: Further direct? 
MR. MAJOR: Yes, a few questions. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MAJOR: 
Q Officer, we have had some testimony about -
on cross-examination, about -- concerning the observation o 
Mr. Bee. You indicated that you had numerous conversations 
with him. At what point was he first initially handcuffed? 
A Right after the Field Sobriety Test, this 
would be at 2240 is the arrest time. 
Q And how was he handcuffed? 
A Behind his back. 
Q Will you stand and demonstrate that for the 
jury? 
A (Witness complied.) 
Q And he was placed in your vehicle. Was he 
handcuffed then? 
A Yes. 
Q Was he handcuffed the same way when he v/as 
taken out of your vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q Was he handcuffed the same way while he was 
1 
MR. OLIVER: I v/ant to demonstrate something to - -
THE COURT: Both counse l may cone . 
MR. OLIVER: I w i l l be e x p l a i n i n g t h i s . I 
j u s t v/ant t o p o i n t t o t he Judge so t h a t he can see e x a c t l y 
what I am t a l k i n g a b o u t . You see where i t says " p e r c e n t 
a l c o h o l i n b l o o d ? " 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. OLIVER: Okay, I will go ahead and 
address that issue, I just wanted to show you that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. OLIVER: The trooper testified directly 
when I asked him exactly what the .09 meant. He testified 
that that meant .09 percent alcohol in the blood. That was 
his response. And he responded identical to that which is 
on this paper. It says "percent alcohol in blood." 
Referring to the statute though, and I refer 
the Court to 41644, sub-section 2, and it says, "Percent by 
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams 
of alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood, and the 
percent by weight of alcohol in the breath shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 200 liters of breath, 210 liters 
of breath." 
This document and this test record does not 
comply with the statutory requirements. There is not a 
percent alcohol in blood as a result. The test results 
1 
should be gauged and should be measured upon -- let me 
just read that again, "based upon grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breathe" And that's what this is. This is a 
result of a test that bases that upon grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath. 
The test results were not expressed as 
such, they are not recognized under the law, there is no 
such thing as percent alcohol in the blood, and that's why 
they have come up with this ratio and this measurement. 
This does not accurately reflect it, Your Honor, it's not 
sufficient under the lav/. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Major? 
MR. OLIVER: And again, just would move that 
that be suppressed as well, Your Honor. 
MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, the thing that we 
would indicate on that -- first off, we will start for the 
top and going backwards. 
The indication here is percent of alcohol 
in the blood. That is simply indicated on the Intoxilizer. 
However, if Your Honor would look, and what the officer testi 
fied to and by no means is the officer an expert, exactly 
what is there. If you look at the affidavit which has been 
submitted into evidence and stipulated to, the affidavit 
indicates that this Intoxilizer machine gives readings in 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
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The Intoxilizer machine has been tested. 
The Intoxilizer machine and the affidavit indicates that is 
what the machine is geared to -- is geared to measure. As 
far as what is on the test record, we would say that the 
affidavits, which would be the expert testimony as to what 
the machine in fact does register, would be submitted on the 
affidavit and indicating a .09. This is the way the matter 
is measured as far as the machine is concerned. 
What is normally indicated is that the 
machine itself is calibrated to take that: measurement and 
equate to the same as the blood draw. So if you draw the 
blood you would get the same reading as if you had taken the 
Intoxilizer breath. But I don't think that is a major 
problem as far as the test record is concerned because the 
affidavit itself indicates that's what the machine -- that's 
what the machine in fact is measuring. 
And so we would -- with that particular 
instance, we would say that in fact the INtoxilizer test 
record is accurate and reflects exactly what the statute 
requires of the test. 
THE COURT: All right, do you have any comment 
on Exhi bit B. 
MR. MAJOR: Exhibit B, Your Honor, yes. As 
far as the checklist is concerned, the officer -- Officer 
HcGuire did indicate here on the checklist that -- he has 
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time, he has 23, which would be 2300 hours, and it is simply 
not written in --
MR. OLIVER: That's not correct, Your 
Honor, That's an assumption thai he can't make. There is 
no indication what that 23 represents. Now, fir. Major is 
making the representation that that is 2300 hours, and I 
disagree with that. 
MR. MAJOR: Well, let's leave it up to the 
Court to decide. 
THE COURT: There was testimony to support 
the 2300 hours, I suppose, from Officer McGuire. Go ahead 
and tell us what is on it. 
MR. MAJOR: Anyway, ic says "time" and there 
is a number 23 after that, Your Honor. However, the rest of 
the matter is filled out. The major portion of what we are 
concerned about is whether or not he followed each and 
everyone of those steps he took. And, as a matter of fact, 
he has testified that in fact he did follow each and every-
one of these steps that he took, and I put it to the Court 
that we don't necessarily need checklist 3. The officer 
testified these are the steps that I took and these are the 
things that I need to make the machine as I have been trained 
to do, and that's what this exhibit indicates. He's testi-
fied, although it's not on this record, he has testified him-
self at what time the tests were given. He testified that, 
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1 "I filled in the written form, I checked out each step as 
2 I performed it, and I performed it as I have been trained 
3 to do," And I think that would be sufficient as far as a 
4 checklist is concerned to qualify it to come in to show tha 
5 in fact the steps were followed in order for the Intoxilize 
6 to operate correctly and give us a correct test result. 
7 That would be our argument as far as the checklist is con-
8 cerned. 
9 THE COURT: Do you have any response as to 
10 Exhibit A? 
11 MR. MAJOR: Yes, Your Honor. As to Exhibi 
12 A, Officer McGuire, on cross-examination, on re-cross, I 
13 guess, or re-re-cross, however we get to it, indicated that 
14 he made a statement that, "Yeah, he handed it up and showed 
15 me and said, 'Look what you missed. 1" However, prior to 
16 that on direct examination, he testified he was filling out 
17 the report, he indicated he saw the pipe that come from the 
18 Defendant, didn't see which pocket or where it had come 
19 from. Throughout his testimony it was that he was aware an 
20 knew it had -- observed it coming from the Defendant. Only 
21 on the re-re-direct, re-re-cross examination did he say, 
22 "Hey, I may not have seen where it was coming from, they 
23 held it up and showed it to me." 
24 Circumstantially, Your Honor, I think we 
25 could -- we would have sufficient evidence to submit it 
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ci rcumstantially. 
The officer has testified there was him 
present* the jailer present, and the only other person 
present was the Defendant, and the testimony is that when 
it was produced it was produced from the Defendant, exactly 
where from the Defendant, the officer does not know exactly 
but in fact it was produced from the Defendant. He is the 
only one present. So circumstantially we could assume much 
the same as we do with other possession cases where we find 
narcotics in and around a person and that they are in control,) 
or it's coming from them through the circumstantial evidence 
I think we have sufficient evidence from the officer's 
testimony that that's probably only the person it could have 
come from, would be the Defendant. And so we would indicate 
that that is the foundation for that to be admitted into 
evidence, Your Honor. 
MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, if I may. 
THt COURT: Please. 
MR. OLIVER: In regards to Exhibit A, there 
has been absolutely no testimony as to where that was 
gathered. Now, Trooper ilcGuire has said he assumes it came 
from him, he believes, he can jump up and down all day but 
he doesn't know where it came from. It could have been in 
the o f f i c e r s hand to begin with, the officer could have 
picked it up off the ground. There's a thousand things that 
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could have happened. We don't even have the officer here who 
collected the evidence. We don't even have him here to 
testify, to cross-examine, and to examine to find out the 
validity of it. Certainly the evidence is unreliable, Your 
Honor, as far as that goes. 
Now, with regards to Exhibits B and C. I 
would further point to the Court to 41644.3, sub-section 2, 
and it says, "In any action or proceeding, unless it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
any alcohol or drug, or operating with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited," this is the 
important portion, Your Honor, "documents offered as memoran-
dum, memoranda of records, of acts, conditions, or events, 
to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used 
was accurate, according to standards established in section 
1." 
What it says is that they have got to be 
accurate, the documents must be accurate, and they are not 
accurate on their face. One of the things that they 
certify in the affidavits is that he certifies that this was 
done correctly. That's fine, I've stipulated to the 
affidavits. I've got no issue with the affidavits. But 
this test record shows, on its face, that the results that 
that machine is measuring is percent alcohol in the blood, 
1 69 
1 and there is no provision for that. 
2 THE COURT: Why do you say that? Why do 
3 you say that there is no provision? 
4 MR* OLIVER: Because the statutory require-
5 ment on that, Your Honor, is that it is measured as grams 
6 per 210 liters of breath. 
7 THE COURT: What the statute says is, "per-
8 cent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based on 
9 grams of alcohol per hundred cubic centimeters of blood, and 
10 the percent by weight of alcohol in the breath shall be based 
11 upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." 
12 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I would be happy, 
13 f ° r just a brief moment, I would be happy to retrieve from 
14 the Layton Police Department their test records which would 
15 show that this has been corrected. Now the records do 
16 reflect that it is grams per 210 liters of breath. 
17 THE COURT: Could be, but what I am saying 
18 is, unless you produce expert testimony to say that that's not 
19 an accurate test of blood alcohol, it seems to me that the 
20 J u r y c a n m a k e up their minds. You can argue what you are 
21 telling me to the jury, but can we say as a matter of law 
22 that that shouldn't come in? 
23 MR. OLIVER: I believe so, Your Honor. And 
24 the reason is because first off the record says, "Percent 
25 alcohol in blood." Okay? That's all it says, "Percent 
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alcohol in blood." 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR OLIVER: At minimum, using the Judge's 
rationale, it says, "percent by weight of alcohol in the 
blood/ 1 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: That isn't even reflected here. 
Percent by weight is not even reflected on the test record. 
I don't think, if we were to bring Trooper Neil in here on 
the best of days, I don't think he would testify that one 
out of every -- what would that be, one out of every 10,000 
parts of blood, or 1,000, one out of every 1,000 parts of 
blood, 1,000 parts. That one out of every 1,000 parts of 
blood would be alcohol. I don't believe he will testify to 
that at all. 
Well, that is not -- but that's what that 
reads, percent of alcohol in the blood. 
THE CuURT: What do you mean when you say 
parts of alcohol? Uo you mean parts by volume or parts by 
weight? 
MR. OLIVER: That is exactly what I am getting 
at, Your Honor. Even at best it doesn't clarify that. The 
record is inadequate on its face. 
THE COURT: All right, so I guess what I am 
saying is, I think you can argue to the jury that the 
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1 prosecution has failed to connect up the significance of 
2 this test record with what that means in terms of the 
3 Defendant's condition, or whether or not it proves the 
4 Defendant violated the statute. But what the statute says 
5 is unlawful and punishable is provided in this section and 
6 I am looking at 44, sub 1, sub A. "For any person to 
7 operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
8 within the state, if a person has a blood or breath alcohol 
9 content of .03 percent or greater by weight as shown by a 
10 chemical test given within two hours," and so forth. 
11 Now, haven't they put on evidence in this, 
12 that he has got blood alcohol of .U9? 
13 MR. OLIVER: Well, Your Honor, I would even 
14 go a little further. I don't want to split too many hairs 
15 here, and my whole point is that the record is inaccurate. 
16 The document that they move to admit is inaccurate on its 
17 face. But, Your Honor, I would go even further because the 
18 statute, in three different places, including the portion that 
19 you just read and then further on down in paragraph 2, again 
20 over in 41644.3 sub paragraph 2, it talks about two different 
21 things. One, it talks about -- "has blood or breath alcohol 
22 content." 
23 Now, the information which has been alleged 
24 here today and which we have been going on, if I can read 
25 J that, it says, "and or driving with a blood alcohol content 
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1 of .08 percent by weight or greater. 
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 MR. OLIVER: I asked the officer, "bid you 
4 draw blood?" He said, 'ilo." The statute specifically 
5 differentiates between blood and breath. There has been no 
6 proof as to what his blood alcohol content was, only what 
7 his breath alcohol content was and, furthermore, the record 
8 is inaccurate on its face. It doesn't clarify and it 
9 doesn't specify exactly what it is measuring. It's inaccurate 
10 on its face and I think that it would be -- I think that it 
11 would be prejudicial to admit it and I think that we should 
12 suppress it, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Major, anything 
14 further? 
15 MR. MAJOR: No, Your Honor, we have nothing 
16 further on that. 
17 THE COURT: All right, we will go off the 
18 record for a moment. 
19 (OFF-THE-RECORD.) 
20 (BACK-ON-THE RECORD.) 
21 THE COURT: Dealing with the last objection 
22 raised by counsel first, that is the objection to Exhibit C, 
23 the Court in reading these regulations submitted by Mr. Oliver 
24 for September 15, finds in paragraph R735-500-2, sub D, sub 
25 6, the provision that all analytical results shall be 
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1 expressed in t e r m i n o l o g y e s t a b l i s h e d by state statute and 
2 reported to two decimal places w i t h o u t rounding off. For 
3 e x a m p l e , a result of 0.237 grams per 210 liters shall be 
4 reported a s , q u o t e , 0.23, u n q u o t e , or as stated by the 
5 c o m m i s s i o n e r . 
6 When the Court applies that to what we have 
7 in proposed Exhibit C, the Court finds that it does express 
8 it in -09, and the Court o v e r r u l e s the o b j e c t i o n to Exhibit 
9 C on that g r o u n d , and admits Exhibit Co 
10 As to Exhibit B, the Court feels the failure 
11 to date it runs to the w e i g h t rather than a d m i s s i b i l i t y and 
12 the Court o v e r r u l e s the o b j e c t i o n to Exhibit B and admits 
13 i t in e v i d e n c e . 
14 As to Exhibit A, the f o u n d a t i o n was e q u i v o c a l , 
15 the o f f i c e r did in fact testify that the pipe came from Mr. 
16 B e e , then when his k n o w l e d g e about that was tested, he 
17 a c k n o w l e d g e d that he didn't a c t u a l l y see it taken from Mr. 
18 B e e . The Court again feels that runs to the w e i g h t of the 
19 exhibit and admits Exhibit A. O v e r r u l e s the o b j e c t i o n to 
20 E x h i b i t A. 
21 Do I have any other m o t i o n s at this point 
22 then? I think those were the only t h r e e , Mr. O l i v e r . 
23 MR. O L I V E R : I have on additional m o t i o n , 
24 Your H o n o r . 
25 THE C O U R T : All right. 
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forgot how many drinks her husband had on this occasion? 
THE COURT: Mr. Major, let me interrupt. We 
have an objection, not on the ground that it is argumentative \ 
but it really is. You may want to pass that. 
MR. MAJOR: We will pass that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MAJOR: We fve got no further questions, 
Your Honor, 
THE COUliT: Further -- any cross? 
MR. OLIVER: None, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Beck 
Thank you 
MR. MAJOR: The State would rest at this 
time, Your Honor. 
MR. OLIVER: The defense rests. 
THE COURT: All right. Both sides rest. 
Counsel, we have a new set of instructions and the Court 
would propose to just go ahead and instruct the jury, unless 
any jurors feel that they need a recess at this time. I 
don't see any indication, and so we will just go ahead with 
the instructions to the jury. 
(The instructions to the jury, closing statements, 
and information pertaining to the verdict are not included 
as part of this transcript.) 
